主题｜Topic：Spillover, Licensing, and Ex-post Privatization in International Duopoly
时间｜Time：5月15日（周五）｜May.15th (Friday)，2:00-5:15PM
地点｜Venue：网课｜Online
主讲｜Speaker
刘懿老师现为湖南大学经济与贸易学院副教授，她博士毕业于美国南伊利诺伊大学经济系。2016年11月进入中国社科院工业经济研究所博士后流动站开展工业组织理论相关研究。2018年6月-9月于日本东京大学社会科学研究所担任客座研究员，进行混合寡头垄断竞争专题研究。目前研究方向主要集中在发展经济学以及工业组织理论等相关领域。
研究领域｜Research Interests
混合寡头垄断视角下的国企改革、民营化、技术授权，以及绿色技术研发等
摘要｜Abstract
This paper studies the impact of innovation spillover and licensing on optimal ex-post privatization policies by involving an exogenous R&D activity in a partial-equilibrium international duopoly setting. By assuming a domestic public firm is relatively inefficient compared to its foreign private rival, we characterize and discuss optimal privatization policies under both foreign private and domestic public innovation. The theoretical results suggest that foreign private (domestic public) innovation, including both spillover and licensing, reduces (increases) the optimal degree of ex-post privatization. In addition, innovation spillover and licensing have the same impact direction on privatization policies. The numerical evidence supports these theoretical findings.
