主题｜Topic：An Experimental Implementation of Cooperative Games
时间｜Time：12月06号（周五）｜Dec. 06th (Friday), 2:00-5:15PM
地点｜Venue：文澴楼709会议室｜Meeting Room 709, WENHUAN
主讲｜Speaker
冷艾琳博士现为南京审计大学泽尔腾经济学实验室助理教授。她于昆士兰大学获得经济学博士学位和本科（含Honours）学位。她的研究领域是实验经济学，主要集中于连续时间的经济实验。已在 Experimental Economics 等期刊发表文章。
研究领域｜Research Interests
实验经济学, 行为经济学, 博弈论
摘要｜Abstract
I propose a continuous time frame to experimentally implement cooperative games. The proposed procedure is not restricted by the set of players or the characteristic function and can be applied to any cooperative game with transferable utility. A classic buyer-seller cooperative game is implemented as an example. In Treatment 1, any of the two buyers can form coalitions with any of the three sellers. In Treatment 2, Buyer 1 and Seller 1 cannot trade, i.e., the coalition including only Buyer 1 and Seller 1 contains zero payoffs. The two treatments have an identical theoretical prediction according to the core; Each buyer claims one unit of the payoff and each seller gets nothing. Results show that while buyers claim significantly higher amounts than sellers, sellers still keep a portion of the surplus. Moreover, one seller is usually left out and gets zero payoffs. The core correctly predicts the payoff of the excluded seller in a single game, while the Shapley value correctly predicts the average payoffs over periods in Treatment 1.
