主题｜Topic：Performance Bundling across Multiple Competitions
时间｜Time：11月1号（周五）｜Nov. 1st (Friday), 2:00-5:15PM
地点｜Venue：文澴楼709会议室｜Meeting Room 709，WENHUAN
主讲｜Speaker
沈波，武汉大学经济与管理学院特聘副研究员，博士毕业于新加坡国立大学。主要研究领域为产业组织和微观经济理论。研究成果发表在 International Journal of Industrial Organization, Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, Journal of Mathematical Economics 等经济学国际期刊。
研究领域｜Research Interests
产业组织和微观经济理论
摘要｜Abstract
In a multi-project contract environment with a single agent who is subject to limited liability, the optimality of performance bundling across all projects is well established: The agent should be rewarded only if all projects are successful. In this paper, we study performance bundling across multiple competitions between two (possibly asymmetric) players. We find that in addition to a beneficial cost-saving effect that diminishes with asymmetry across players, performance bundling causes a counterproductive unbalancing effect, which intensifies with this asymmetry. Thus, performance bundling is desirable only if the players are sufficiently symmetric. Otherwise, a set of independent contests is optimal.
