主题｜Topic：How to sell a new durable good: A signaling rationale for Hunger Marketing
时间｜Time：10月18号（周五）｜Oct. 18th (Friday), 2:00-5:15PM
地点｜Venue：文澴楼709会议室｜Meeting Room 709，WENHUAN
主讲｜Speaker
张岚，经济学博士，西南财经大学副教授；本科毕业于南开大学经济系，博士毕业于美国印第安纳大学凯利商学院（Kelley School of Business, Indiana University Bloomington）。学术成果发表于Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, International Journal of Game Theory, Journal of Industrial Economics, Journal of Transportation Economics and Policy, Economic Letters 和《经济学（季刊）》等杂志上。
研究领域｜Research Interests
微观经济学和应用经济学
摘要｜Abstract
We study the increasingly popular hunger marketing strategy (a combination of an artificially low price and a supply limit) adopted by many high-tech startups to launch their products. In a two-period model, a firm offers an artificially low introductory price and also imposes a limit on the quantity available for sales in the first period, which leads to a shortage in the equilibrium. We show that when effective word of mouth is present, such a strategy allows a firm to credibly convince the market of the premium quality of its product. We demonstrate that word of mouth plays a critical role in catalyzing the signaling mechanism. When word of mouth becomes more efficient, e.g., enabled by social media, shortage is larger in the equilibrium, and the introductory price falls further. Our study provides a rationale for hunger marketing.
