文澜学术系列讲座 第162期对外经济贸易大学金融学院李昭助理教授:“Contagious Bank Runs and Buyer of Last Resort”
日期:2019-06-05             信息来源:文澜学院

主题|TopicContagious Bank Runs and Buyer of Last Resort

时间|Time614号(周五)|June 14th (Friday), 2:00-4:30PM

地点Venue文澴楼709会议室|Meeting Room 709WENHUAN


主讲|Speaker

李昭,对外经济贸易大学金融学院助理教授。研究领域为:微观银行学,金融监管理论,信息经济学,博弈论应用。博士毕业于西班牙庞贝法布拉大学,硕士毕业于法国图卢兹经济学院,本科毕业于武汉大学。曾任欧盟玛丽居里项目研究员,瑞典中央银行经济学家。论文多次在AEA, FIRS, WEAICICF等国际、国内高层次会议宣讲。主持一项自然科学基金青年项目,参与多项国家级项目。


研究领域|Research Interests 

微观银行学,金融监管理论,信息经济学,博弈论应用

Micro Banking, Financial Regulation Theory, Information Economics, Application of Game Theory


摘要|Abstract

In a crisis, central banks and private investors can find it difficult, if not impossible, to tell whether banks facing runs are insolvent or merely illiquid. In a global-games frame- work, we show that the lack of information leads to distressed asset prices and restricts central banks’ ability to act as a lender of last resort. Under aggregate uncertainty, fi- nancial contagion and price volatility emerge as multiple-equilibria phenomena despite global-games refinements. We explain how a central bank can use a buyer-of-last-resort policy to contain contagion and stabilize asset prices while breaking even ex ante—even without information on individual banks’ solvency.