主题｜Topic：Contagious Bank Runs and Buyer of Last Resort
时间｜Time：6月14号（周五）｜June 14th (Friday), 2:00-4:30PM
地点｜Venue：文澴楼709会议室｜Meeting Room 709，WENHUAN
主讲｜Speaker
李昭，对外经济贸易大学金融学院助理教授。研究领域为：微观银行学，金融监管理论，信息经济学，博弈论应用。博士毕业于西班牙庞贝法布拉大学，硕士毕业于法国图卢兹经济学院，本科毕业于武汉大学。曾任欧盟玛丽居里项目研究员，瑞典中央银行经济学家。论文多次在AEA, FIRS, WEAI，CICF等国际、国内高层次会议宣讲。主持一项自然科学基金青年项目，参与多项国家级项目。
研究领域｜Research Interests
微观银行学，金融监管理论，信息经济学，博弈论应用
Micro Banking, Financial Regulation Theory, Information Economics, Application of Game Theory
摘要｜Abstract
In a crisis, central banks and private investors can find it difficult, if not impossible, to tell whether banks facing runs are insolvent or merely illiquid. In a global-games frame- work, we show that the lack of information leads to distressed asset prices and restricts central banks’ ability to act as a lender of last resort. Under aggregate uncertainty, fi- nancial contagion and price volatility emerge as multiple-equilibria phenomena despite global-games refinements. We explain how a central bank can use a buyer-of-last-resort policy to contain contagion and stabilize asset prices while breaking even ex ante—even without information on individual banks’ solvency.
