文澜学术系列讲座 第144期 西交利物浦大学Gergely Horvath老师:“Whistleblowing and Diffusion of Responsibility. An Experiment”
日期:2019-03-13             信息来源:文澜学院

主题|TopicWhistleblowing and Diffusion of Responsibility. An Experiment

时间|Time315号(周五)|March 15th (Friday), 200 - 430PM

地点Venue文澴楼709会议室|Meeting Room 709WENHUAN


主讲|Speaker

Gergely Horvath 老师任职于西交利物浦大学国际商学院,主要研究社会网络,劳动经济学,实验和行为经济学,基于代理的建模等方向。已在国际知名经济学 Economics LettersJournal of Economic Behavior and OrganizationThe B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics (Contributions) 等学术期刊发表论文多篇。


研究领域|Research Interests 

Social Networks, Labor Economics, Experimental and Behavioral Economics, Agent-Based Modeling

社会网络,劳动经济学,实验行为经济学,基于代理的建模


摘要|Abstract

In this paper we examine diffusion of responsibility in a whistleblowing experiment. We use a multiplayer asymmetric information ultimatum game where only the proposer and a subset of the responders know the size of a pie that the proposer distributes among information insiders and outsiders. Insiders have a clear monetary incentive to whistleblow in case of a small pie in order to avoid rejection of seemingly unfair offers by outsiders; in case of a large pie only altruistic motives could explain that insiders whistleblow. We vary the number of information insiders, one or two, who can whistleblow. We find that close to 60% of the insiders whistleblow in a treatment when they are pivotal for both, small and large pies. In a treatment where other insiders can also blow the whistle, we observe a significant drop in case only altruistic motives can explain whistleblowing. We show that the effect is due to the extensive margin, i.e. the share of whistleblowers drops to 20%, while patterns of active whistleblowers do not change. In case of low pie sizes, where whistleblowing is in line with selfish motives, we do not observe diffusion of responsibility, in spite of a possible free riding incentive due to a positive cost of whistleblowing.