主题｜Topic：Heterogeneity and Unanimity: Optimal Committees with Information Acquisition
时间｜Time：11.18（周一）14: 00-15: 30
地点｜Venue：文澴楼教室｜Class Room 428，WENHUAN
主办单位｜Organizer：文澜学院
承办单位｜Operator：数实融合研究中心；北京大学-中南财经政法大学新结构经济学研究中心
主讲｜Speaker
赵昕，对外经济贸易大学国际经济贸易学院，副教授。主要研究领域为微观经济理论、政治经济学以及行为/实验经济学，研究成果已发表于RAND Journal of Economics，Games and Economic Behavior，Canadian Journal of Economics，Journal of Regulatory Economics等期刊，并主持一项国家自然科学基金面上项目。
摘要｜Abstract
This paper studies how the composition and voting rule of a decision-making committee affect the incentives for its members to acquire information. Fixing the voting rule, a more polarized committee acquires more information under mild conditions. If a committee designer can choose the committee members and voting rule to maximize her payoff from the collective decision, she forms a heterogeneous committee adopting a unanimous rule, in which one member moderately biased toward one decision serves as the decisive voter, and all others are extremely opposed to the decisive voter and serve as information providers. The preference of the decisive voter is not perfectly aligned with that of the designer.
